Our theory and findings suggest that relatively negative stock analyst appraisals prompt corporate leaders to increase externally visible dimensions of board independence without actually increasing board control of management. We also consider how relatively negative analyst appraisals may prompt impression management in CEO communications with analysts, whereby CEOs attest to their boards' tendency to monitor and control management on behalf of shareholders. We also find that increases in formal board independence, in combination with verbal impression management directed toward analysts, result in more favorable subsequent analyst appraisals of firms, despite a lack of effect on actual board control.
In recent years, research on corporate governance has flourished in multiple disciplines. The development of agency theory in the 1980s renewed interest in corporate governance among financial economists and strategic management scholars. From an agency perspective, financial incentives and decision control by a firm's board of directors are critical to ensuring that the firm's managers promote shareholder interests (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kosnik, 1990) . Behavioral scholars in management and organizations have extended agency theory by examining how power and politics in management-board relationships can compromise the relationship between executive pay and shareholder returns, while also reducing the propensity for boards to monitor and control executive decision making (for reviews, see Finkelstein, Hambrick, Cannella [2009] , Hillman and Dalziel [2003] , and Lynall, Golden, and Hillman [2003] ).
Recently, organization theorists have developed a more expansive, sociopolitical perspective on corporate governance that encompasses how corporate leaders seek to manage the impressions of external constituents about governance structures, policies, and procedures (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Wade, Porac, & Pollock, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 1998; Zott & Huy, 2007) . From this perspective, corporate leaders adopt organizational characteristics that visibly demonstrate conformity to prevailing ideologies or institutional logics of corporate governance in order to enhance organizational legitimacy. Moreover, impression management theorists have suggested how and when organizational action is more symbolic than substantive, in that externally visible policies and structures appear to conform to prevailing normative prescriptions, but actual governance practices reflect the political interests of powerful organizational actors (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Elsbach, 2003; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1998) . For example, in a series of studies (Westphal & Zajac, 1994 , 1998 , Westphal and Zajac have examined impression management in the domain of executive compensation. They suggested that the agency perspective on governance has become predominant, or "institutionalized," among members of the financial community (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; Useem, 1993; Wade et al., 1997) , prompting firms to adopt executive incentive plans that give the appearance of conformity to agency prescriptions. They also provided evidence that firms with influential CEOs were more likely to adopt incentive plans that appeared to align executive and shareholder interests without actually implementing the plans, thus conforming to normative compensation policy without sacrificing CEOs' preference for risk-free compensation.
Although recent research has investigated impres-
We are grateful to Sendil Ethiraj, Michael Jensen, Hart Posen, Minyuan Zhao, David Zhu, and seminar participants at the University of Michigan for providing helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. sion management in regard to executive incentive alignment, researchers have not considered the potential for impression management in regard to board monitoring and control of management, arguably the primary normative prescription of the agency approach to governance. If the agency perspective has become predominant in the financial community (Davis, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 1998) , then financial stakeholders are likely to assess a board's apparent capacity to exercise control over management when making judgments about a firm's governance. In fact, a recent large-sample survey of financial analysts and institutional investors reported that "three-quarters of [participants] from the U.S., Europe, Latin America and Asia said that board practices, [defined as board controls], are just as important to them as financial performance when they evaluate companies for investment" (Investor Relations Business, 2000: 1; also see Coombes and Watson [2000] ). Given the importance of board control as an evaluative criterion, we might expect that corporate leaders would attempt to manage stakeholder impressions about the governance of their firms by engaging in actions and communications that project an image of active decision control on the part of their boards.
Accordingly, in this study we considered how and when corporate leaders may manage stakeholder impressions about board monitoring and control of management. The first part of our theoretical framework addresses the antecedents of such impression management. In particular, we argue that relatively negative appraisals of a firm by security analysts may prompt powerful leaders to make changes in a board's composition that appear to enhance its capacity to monitor and control executives but do not actually increase that capacity. We begin our theoretical argument by observing that the agency perspective effectively equates a board's capacity to exercise control with its formal independence from management (defined as the proportion of directors who lack contractual ties to the firm), despite evidence that boards must be formally and socially independent from management in order to exercise control effectively (e.g., directors must be without friendship ties to top managers as well as without contractual ties to the firm to exercise independent control). We contend that powerful leaders can give the impression of enhancing their boards' control capacity, without actually increasing it, via changes in board composition that increase formal independence from management without increasing social independence. Leaders achieve this end by adding directors who lack formal firm ties but have friendship ties to management. We also extend our theory to consider verbal impression management, whereby CEOs, in their communications with analysts, attest to their boards' propensity to monitor and control management on behalf of shareholders.
The second part of our framework addresses the consequences of impression management for analyst decision making. We develop hypotheses that address how the adoption of board characteristics assumed to indicate monitoring and control capacity (i.e., increased formal independence) combine with CEO verbal impression management to prompt analysts to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts and more positive stock recommendations for a firm. Our theory outlines why the adoption of normatively prescribed board attributes and verbal impression management may influence analyst decision making even when visible board characteristics and CEO communications do not reflect actual board behavior. Figure  1 summarizes our theoretical framework.
Our theory and findings contribute to the corporate governance literature by exploring the potential for impression management in the domain of corporate boards. In doing so, our study provides a novel perspective on board independence from management. Whereas researchers and corporate stakeholders have tended to view increases in formal board independence as reforms that are intended to improve governance by increasing board control, we suggest that under certain circumstances such changes are acts of impression management intended to create the appearance of improved governance without actually increasing board control. Moreover, our study provides an original perspective on the consequences of increased board independence for organizations. Two major scholarly perspectives on the effects of formal board independence currently exist. Many organizational and behavioral strategy scholars see increases in formal board independence as having little impact on organizations, as evidenced by weak or insignificant effects of such changes on CEO compensation, corporate strategy, and firm performance (for a review, see Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson [1998] ). Financial economists and management researchers who take a more economic view of organizations tend instead to see increased formal board independence as a primary means of improving corporate governance, citing evidence that increased formal independence garners positive stock market reactions, higher bond ratings, and other endorsements from the financial community (e.g., Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990) . Our theory suggests an alternative perspective on the consequences of formal board independence that explains both sets of findings. Specifically, taking an impression management perspective, we suggest that corporate leaders garner positive reactions from the financial community via changes in board composition that appear to conform to agency conceptions of gov-ernance but do not increase board social independence from management. These changes do not increase actual board control and consequently may not lead to shareholder-oriented changes in policy and strategy or improvements in firm profitability. In effect, our theory reveals that greater formal board independence has the important consequence of enhancing the legitimacy of a firm's corporate governance with financial stakeholders, without engendering substantive improvements in the governance of the firm. Our theory also suggests that CEOs further amplify the legitimacy benefits of formal board independence by directing verbal impression management toward analysts in which they attest to the board's propensity to control management on behalf of shareholders.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Increased Board Independence as Impression Management
The agency logic of corporate governance proceeds from the assumption that executive preferences regarding corporate policy and strategy conflict with the interests of shareholders (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . In the absence of appropriate controls, executives will generate "agency costs" by pursuing strategies, such as unrelated diversification, that enhance their personal wealth and minimize their employment risk at the expense of shareholder wealth maximization. As noted above, one means of alleviating agency costs is the adoption of long-term incentive plans that partially align executive compensation with shareholder interests. In addition, shareholders must rely on boards of directors, and especially independent directors, to minimize agency costs by monitoring and controlling management decision making on their behalf Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994) . According to the agency logic, independent directors 1 are ideally po- 1 The precise definition of director independence varies somewhat in the agency literature (see Dalton et al., 1998) . Some researchers have simply defined independent directors as those who are not full-time employees, but most researchers now use a more stringent definition that excludes so-called affiliated directors, or directors with contractual firm ties (Brickley et al., 1994) . In effect, according to this contemporary definition, independent directors are "individuals whose only business relationship with the firm is their board membership" (Anderson 
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× sitioned to exercise control over top managers: as members of a firm's board, they have access to reliable and timely information about executives' decision making and performance, yet the lack of dependence on top executives for compensation or employment enables these directors to exercise control without fear of reprisal. Thus, from an agency perspective, increasing the board's independence from management is a primary means by which corporate leaders improve the quality of corporate governance.
The sociological literature provides considerable evidence that the agency logic now dominates the financial community's view of corporate governance (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; , 2004 . Research by Useem (1993) , Westphal and Zajac (1995) , Zajac and Westphal (2004) , and Davis and colleagues Davis & Thompson, 1994) has shown that during the 1980s and 1990s investors increasingly assessed corporate policies according to whether they appeared to reduce agency costs. For instance, Zajac and Westphal (1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1994 , 1998 demonstrated that investors increasingly viewed CEO long-term incentive plans as a mechanism for aligning executive and shareholder interests, resulting in more positive stock market reactions to the adoption of these plans over time. Moreover, the increasingly positive stock market reactions were progressively less contingent on the extent to which the plans were actually implemented or yielded performance benefits, suggesting that the agency logic had become institutionalized, or taken for granted, among investors (Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004) . The agency tenet that greater independence from management improves the quality of corporate governance by enhancing a board's control capacity is "conventional wisdom" in the financial community (Langevoort, 2006 (Langevoort, : 1553 . In fact, increases in the level of board independence from management are routinely equated with greater board control in the popular finance press (e.g., Bank Loan Report, 2004; Corporate Board, 2006; Investor Relations Business, 2000) . A recent large-sample survey of analysts and investors concluded that "a well-governed company was defined by investors as a company with a majority of outside directors on its board" (Investor Relations Business, 2000: 1; also see Coombes and Watson [2000] ).
Thus, by increasing a board's independence from management, corporate leaders can enhance legitimacy in the financial community by increasing congruence between visible attributes of the board and widely shared investor beliefs about good governance (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995) . Increased board independence should influence each of the three forms of legitimacy identified by Suchman (1995) . It should enhance a firm's "pragmatic legitimacy," derived from appealing to the self-interest of constituents, because greater independence is taken to indicate stronger board control exerted on behalf of shareholder interests (Suchman, 1995: 578) . Then, given that increasing board independence is a central normative prescription or "injunctive norm" of the agency logic (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004: 597; Strang & Sine, 2002) , it should also enhance the firm's normative legitimacy. Further, as a reform that is integral to a prevailing institutional logic, increased formal independence makes firm governance more comprehensible to members of the financial community, conferring "cognitive legitimacy" (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Suchman, 1995: 582) .
When firms enhance the legitimacy of corporate governance practices, they also enhance the legitimacy of their strategies. Increasing board independence from management creates the impression that corporate leaders can be trusted to pursue shareholder interests rather than their own preferences. By adopting normative reforms such as greater board independence, moreover, corporate leaders may also bolster confidence or competencebased trust in their leadership (Elsbach & Elofson, 2000) . Thus, given some uncertainty about the specific content or consequences of corporate strategies, analysts and other financial stakeholders are likely to respond more positively to strategies following the adoption of board reforms that increase independence from management.
More generally, therefore, increased board independence may have appreciable symbolic value to corporate leaders. A corporate action has symbolic value to the extent that it projects a positive image of a firm that goes beyond the direct effects of the action itself (Elsbach, 2003; Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1994) . In this case, composition changes that increase board independence confer positive symbolic value on a firm and its leaders by expressing a shareholder orientation toward governance, thereby influencing stakeholders' interpretations of a range of corporate policies and strategies. Thus, under certain circumstances firm leaders may ini- & Reeb, 2004: 324; also see Berry et al. [2006] and Brickley et al. [1994] ). This definition is also widespread among regulators and various watchdog organizations such as the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) (Langevoort, 2006) . tiate composition changes to symbolically manage their relations with financial stakeholders.
Our discussion thus far suggests that increasing board independence from management may enhance the financial community's impression of a firm's governance, strategy, and leadership. We further suggest that the value of such impression management may be especially great when security analysts have assessed the firm's performance prospects relatively negatively. The social influence literature provides considerable evidence that the subjective expected utility of impression management tactics predicts the likelihood that individuals will use them (Barry & Watson, 1996; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992) . The subjective expected utility of an impression management tactic in turn depends on two factors: the perceived likelihood that the tactic will successfully create a favorable impression, and the perceived value or worth of that impression to the focal actor (Barry & Watson, 1996; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Lindscold, 1972) . Extensive evidence shows that analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations significantly influence trading behavior and stock market valuations (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996) . There is also evidence that negative analyst appraisals (defined here as relatively low earnings forecasts or negative stock recommendations) sometimes prompt institutional investors to directly intervene in strategic decision making, thus threatening the autonomy and decision-making authority of top managers. In some cases, negative analyst appraisals can prompt institutional investors to force reductions in a CEO's compensation, or even force the CEO's resignation (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Useem, 1996) . Thus, when analyst appraisals have been relatively negative, top managers especially benefit from symbolic actions that bolster analysts' confidence in the governance and strategy of their firms. In particular, by increasing board independence from management and giving analysts the impression that agency costs are under control, leaders may prompt analysts to issue more positive appraisals of their firms, ultimately increasing their market value and access to capital, and decreasing the likelihood that institutional investors will intervene in strategic decision making, force CEO pay reductions, or force CEO resignation. Where analysts have already issued positive appraisals, by contrast, there is less need to engage in such impression management.
Increasing board independence vs. increasing board control. Although executives may derive legitimacy benefits from reforms that enhance board control over management, such changes conflict with managerial preferences for decision-making discretion and autonomy (Mizruchi, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 1998) . Moreover, increased board control has been linked to lower executive compensation and perquisites, greater compensation risk, and higher rates of executive dismissal during periods of poor firm performance (for a review, see Finkelstein et al. [2008] ). Thus, top executives would appear to face the dilemma of capturing legitimacy benefits without sacrificing control. However, behavioral perspectives on corporate governance distinguish between a board's contractual, or "formal," independence from management (defined as the proportion of directors who lack contractual ties to their firm) (Anderson & Reeb, 2004: 234; McNulty, Roberts, & Stiles, 2005) and its social independence (e.g., the absence of friendship ties between executives and board members). The behavioral literature provides evidence that increases in formal board independence do not necessarily predict higher firm performance or specific policy changes that are assumed to benefit shareholders, such as less unrelated diversification, increased CEO turnover following poor firm performance, and lower executive compensation (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Dalton et al., 1998; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003; Westphal, 1998) . A number of studies have shown that the proportion of outside directors without social connections to executives is the stronger predictor of proshareholder policy changes (Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990; ; for reviews, see Finkelstein et al. [2008] and Lynall et al. [2003] ). Behavioral scholars have noted that directors with friendship ties to a CEO are likely to feel conflicted about firing the CEO or blocking his or her preferences, and they are likely to be biased in the CEO's favor when making attributions about firm performance (Finkelstein et al., 2008; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Westphal, 1998) . In short, theory and evidence from the behavioral literature suggest that boards must be both formally and socially independent from management to objectively control management decision making.
Yet the agency logic of governance, derived as it is from an economic model of organization (Davis, 2005; Zajac & Westphal, 2004) , focuses primarily on the contractual dimensions of board independence and gives little consideration to its social dimensions (see Brudney, 1982; Langevoort, 2006) . Accordingly, the prevailing evaluative criterion for corporate governance in the financial community is formal independence, which is effectively equated with capacity to exercise control; security analysts, financial economists, and other members of the financial community generally do not consider how social dimensions of the management-board relationship (e.g., friendship ties) may compromise a board's capacity to engage in independent control. The financial community's lack of attention to social dimensions provides an opportunity for powerful top managers to capture legitimacy benefits without compromising their control over corporate policy. Specifically, they can favor the appointment of directors who lack visible contractual ties to their firm but who nevertheless have friendship ties to executives, thus increasing a board's formal independence without increasing its social independence (which may even be decreased by the composition changes). In this way leaders separate substance and symbolism (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995) in the domain of corporate governance: they conform to prevailing definitions of good governance, thus bolstering their firms' legitimacy among security analysts and other external observers, while maintaining their discretion and autonomy in policy making. Leaders can accomplish both objectives simultaneously because of "information asymmetry" between themselves and observers (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981) : both executive-director social ties and the behavioral dynamics of CEOboard relationships are difficult for external constituents to observe and monitor.
The moderating effect of CEO social influence over a nominating committee. Though CEOs may be motivated to appoint directors with whom they have existing social ties, their ability to do so is likely to depend on their a priori social influence over the nominating committees of their firms' boards. A CEO typically suggests possible board candidates to this committee, which then ostensibly makes the final selections. Although the committee is expected to represent shareholder interests by selecting the most experienced and qualified candidates, regardless of their ties to the CEO (Phan, 2000; Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004; Vafeas, 1999) , research on director selection suggests that when a CEO has social ties to committee members, the CEO can substantially influence selection, so that her/his preferred candidates tend to receive nominations (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; . In this way, the CEO's social influence over the board is perpetuated: when committee members have social connections (e.g., friendship ties) to the CEO they are reluctant to circumvent the CEO's preferences regarding board candidates, thus enabling the CEO to appoint new directors with whom they also have social ties. By extension, a priori CEO-committee ties should permit the separation of substance and symbol regarding board independence from management. When CEOs exert substantial social influence over nominating committee members, they can better add directors without visible contractual ties to their firms but with whom they have friendship ties, thus increasing a board's formal independence (giving the appearance of greater board control) without increasing its social independence (thus avoiding actual increases in board control). As discussed above, our theoretical perspective suggests that CEOs are especially motivated to increase formal board independence when security analysts have issued relatively negative appraisals. This discussion leads to the following: 
Verbal Impression Management Directed toward Analysts
Our theory also suggests that a firm's leaders may use verbal impression management to enhance external stakeholders' confidence in the firm's corporate governance. Prior research suggests that verbal impression management tactics are most effective when they frame corporate conduct in terms of widely shared normative prescriptions (Elsbach, 1994; Hareli, 2005; Pedriana & Stryker, 1997; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992; Zott & Huy, 2007) . Thus, we suggest that CEOs seek to manage the impressions of security analysts about the quality of their firms' governance by using language claiming that their boards actively and independently control management decision making on the behalf of shareholders.
2 In using such language, CEOs link the conduct of their boards to a central normative prescription of the agency logic of governance, thus increasing the perceived congruence between their firms' governance and assumptions about good governance practices widely held in the financial community. This congruence enhances firms' normative and cognitive legitimacy with analysts by creating the perception of "procedural conformity," or conformity to "institutionally defined meansend chains an organization is [expected] to follow to realize desired objectives" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2002: 196 ; also see Meyer and Rowan [1977] and Suchman [1995] ).
Verbal impression management about board control may also enhance the legitimacy of policy and strategy initiatives in several ways. The literature on social influence suggests that impression management tactics are most effective when they speak to the motives or intentions of a focal actor, and not merely to the actor's capabilities (Aerts, 2005; Wayne & Kacmar, 1991) . In emphasizing board involvement in decision control, CEOs create the impression that shareholder wealth maximization rather than managerial preference motivates decisions. Social influence theory also suggests that impression management is most effective when it involves positive statements about another person or group rather than self-promotion. As Jones and Pittman (1982) and others have written, self-promotion may be interpreted as arrogance or conceit, which engenders negative affect toward the source (Schlenker & Weigold, 1992; Turnley & Bolino, 2001; Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris, 1997) . Impression management about a third party-such as CEO impression management about a board-should be less likely to engender such a reaction. Moreover, impression management is thought to be most persuasive when it includes relatively simple and concise descriptions of organizational activity (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997; Elsbach & Elofson, 2000; Pfeffer, 1981) . As Schlenker and Weigold noted, "People think 'truth' comes in tidy packages" (1992: 144). The agency logic permits concise descriptions of corporate governance because it reduces the complexity of governance to a single dimension-board control of management. Board control connotes a set of economic values and assumptions that are linked to the agency logic, including the rights of owners (i.e., shareholders) and the critical importance of control (e.g., versus knowledge or cooperation) to organizational effectiveness (Davis, 2005; Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Zajac & Westphal, 2004) . By implicitly affirming these values and assumptions, CEOs make analysts more receptive to their claims. Thus, CEOs can construct concise yet persuasive accounts of board behavior by appealing to the agency logic.
Further, impression management is most effective when it addresses topics with which the influence target "does not have significant personal involvement" (Murphy & Shleifer, 2004: 435 ; also see Kuperman [2003] ). In the present context, security analysts rarely have personal experience with board decision making-at the firms they are analyzing or elsewhere-and therefore face significant knowledge and information asymmetries in relation to CEOs. Impression management by CEOs may also be effective because it comes from a highstatus source. The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion suggests that the status of a communication source is an important determinant of the amount of effortful cognitive processing or "elaboration" that is devoted to a persuasive message (Petty, Wegener, Chaiken, & Trope, 1999: 42) . In effect, people tend to be more trusting of information provided by a high-status actor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Ziegler et al., 2004) .
As discussed above, the social influence literature has shown that impression management behavior is more likely when its subjective expected utility is relatively high (Barry & Watson, 1996) . The latter depends, in turn, on the likelihood that the behavior will effectively create a favorable impression and on the perceived value of that impression to the focal actor. Our theoretical argument suggests that CEO attestations of board decision control should create a favorable impression of corporate governance and strategy among members of the financial community. As with increased board independence, moreover, the value of such impression management may be especially great when analysts have rendered relatively negative assessments of the firm's performance. By improving an analyst's impressions of a firm's governance, its CEO increases the likelihood that the analyst will upgrade the firm's stock and issue more optimistic earnings forecasts, thus attracting more investors to the firm. Conversely, there is less need to manage the impressions of an analyst who has already positively appraised the firm. Thus:
Hypothesis 2. Negative analyst appraisals are positively associated with subsequent CEO verbal impression management about board control directed toward those analysts.
Increased Board Independence, Verbal Impression Management, and Subsequent Analyst Appraisals
In this section, we develop further hypotheses that address the consequences of impression management in the realm of corporate boards. Our theoretical perspective suggests that increasing formal board independence enhances legitimacy among analysts by increasing congruence between board characteristics and normatively accepted criteria for evaluating corporate governance practices (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995) . With the agency logic taken for granted in the financial community (Davis, 2005; Zajac & Westphal, 2004) , increased board independence enhances a firm's normative and cognitive legiti-macy with financial stakeholders by "demonstrating that [the organization] is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 349) . The appearance of board independence also creates the impression that top executives can be trusted to pursue shareholder interests rather than personal preferences. We have also argued that formal board independence may have legitimacy benefits even when it does not reflect the actual level of board control over management. Although behavioral theory and research suggest that formal board independence does not necessarily indicate social independence from management, and that both kinds of independence may be required to ensure board control, agency logic equates formal independence with propensity to control. Firms may derive legitimacy benefits from increasing formal board independence, even if this dimension of board composition is decoupled from actual board behavior. Such legitimacy benefits should be manifested in more positive analyst appraisals of a focal company. Thus, we offer an additional hypothesis regarding increased formal board independence.
Hypothesis 3. With the actual level of board control over management decision making held constant, increased formal board independence is associated with more positive subsequent analyst appraisals of a firm.
Our theoretical perspective also suggests that verbal impression management in which a firm's CEO attempts to create the impression among security analysts that the firm's board actively and independently controls management decision making on behalf of shareholders tends to result in more positive analyst appraisals of the firm. Such communications frame board behavior in terms of a central normative prescription of the agency logic, thus enhancing the firm's normative and cognitive legitimacy with financial stakeholders by creating the perception of conformity to widely held assumptions about appropriate governance practices. More generally, our theoretical argument suggests that such communications satisfy criteria set forth in the social influence literature for successful impression management. In attesting to a board's involvement in decision control, a CEO uses socially legitimate language that identifies the board with a prevailing ideology or institutional logic, which should reduce critical scrutiny of the message (Hareli, 2005; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992) . The CEO is also making claims on behalf of another party (i.e., the board), which is generally more effective than self-promotion as a form of impression management (Turnley & Bolino, 2001; Wayne et al., 1997) . Moreover, our theory suggests why the relative status of a CEO and information and knowledge asymmetries between the CEO and analysts should also tend to reduce critical scrutiny, or cognitive "elaboration" that is devoted to the message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty et al., 1999: 42; Ziegler et al., 2004) . Thus, our theoretical perspective leads to an additional hypothesis regarding the consequences of CEO verbal impression management:
Hypothesis 4. With the actual level of board control over management decision making held constant, CEO verbal impression management about board control directed toward analysts is associated with more positive subsequent analyst appraisals of a firm.
CEO verbal impression management may also interact with formal board independence to affect analyst decision making. Theory and research suggest that verbal impression management tends to be more effective when coupled with visible attributes that lend credence to the actor's claims (Barry & Watson, 1996; Elsbach, 2003) . In the present context, claims by a firm's CEO that the board is actively involved in controlling management may be most credible to financial stakeholders when the board exhibits formal independence, given that this dimension of board composition is generally assumed by members of the financial community to indicate the board's control capacity. Conversely, the impression management literature also suggests that verbal impression management can reinforce the effects of socially legitimate attributes on an actor's image by making those attributes more salient to members of the target audience (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Siegel & Brockner, 2005) . Accordingly, verbal impression management about board decision control may increase analysts' awareness of board independence, or make it more salient to them, thus increasing the effects of board independence on their judgments about a firm. This suggests an interaction between CEO verbal impression management and increased formal independence affecting analyst appraisals: 
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
The sample frame for this study included public U.S. companies with over $100 million in revenues that were covered by at least one "sell-side" security analyst. (Sell-side security analysts conduct research and generate stock recommendations that are circulated to a brokerage firm's clients.) We gathered archival data and surveyed three groups:
(1) CEOs and other executives at focal firms, (2) sell-side equity analysts who covered those firms, and (3) outside directors at the firms. First, for the executive survey, questionnaires were sent to CEOs, chief financial officers (CFOs) and investment relations officers (IROs) at a random sample of 3,280 firms in the sample frame. Half of the firms were surveyed in January 2001 and the other half were surveyed in January 2003. Second, to check the reliability of executives' responses regarding their relationships with sell-side analysts, we sent a questionnaire in April 2001 to a random sample of 800 analysts who covered one or more firms with responding top executives. Third, questionnaires were sent to all outside directors at firms with responding top executives, both in the years of the executive surveys (2001 and 2003) and one year after the executive surveys.
We followed procedures that have been shown to maximize survey response rates for top executives (cf. Westphal, 1999) . Specifically, we used feedback from a qualitative pretest that included interviews with 20 current or former top managers and security analysts to revise the layout, appearance, and content of the survey, making it easier and more appealing to complete. The cover letter introduced the survey as part of a larger research project on relations between managers and external constituents, noting that thousands of directors and managers had already participated in the project by responding to prior surveys. The survey was also endorsed by a prominent top executive, and two additional waves of surveys were distributed to nonrespondents. Six hundred and seventy-four CEOs responded to the 2001 survey (41%), and 637 CEOs responded to the 2003 survey (39%). In total, 1,311 different CEOs responded, providing information pertaining to a total of 2,308 different analysts. The separate analyst survey yielded responses from 331 analysts, a response rate of 41 percent. Thirty-eight percent of the outside directors responded to our survey in 2001 and 2003 , and the response rates for outside directors in 2002 and 2004 were 39 and 37 percent, respectively. We used Heckman models to test for sample selection bias. This two-staged procedure first estimated the likelihood of responding to the survey using probit regression and then included parameter estimates from the first equation in a second-stage theoretical model. The selection equation included all independent and control variables derived from archival data sources. The selection parameter was insignificant in these models, and the results of tests of hypothesized associations were consistently very similar to those presented below, suggesting that nonresponse bias is not confounding our interpretation of the results.
We obtained data on analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations from the I/B/E/S Database. Data on board structure and composition were collected from Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives and from company proxy statements. We also collected data for numerous control variables, including the following: earnings announcements and the size of analysts' employers, from the I/B/E/S database; CEO ownership and compensation, from proxies and the COMPUSTAT EXECUCOMP database; corporate diversification and sales, from COMPUSTAT; institutional ownership, from Thomson Financial Securities Data; and acquisition activity, from COMPUSTAT and the Securities Data Corporation.
Measures
To increase the validity of our survey measures, we used feedback from the pretest to clarify the survey instructions and refine the wording of specific questions. The scales included a variety of response formats, some prompting respondents to report the number of times a specific behavior had occurred over a specified period of time, which is known to increase scale validity (DeVellis, 1991) .
CEO verbal impression management about board control. We developed a six-item scale to assess the extent to which CEOs engage in verbal impression management directed toward analysts about board propensity to control management decision making. Scale items were adapted to the present context from earlier measures of managerial impression management (e.g., Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988) , and the wording of each question was refined with feedback from the pretest. Appendix A gives the texts of all items.
Respondents indicated how frequently during the prior year they had sought to persuade or convince analysts that their boards engaged in independent control. Given that verbal impression management is typically characterized as strategic or "goal-directed" behavior (Gardner & Avolio, 1998: 34) , two questions directly assessed the ob-jective behind CEOs' communications (e.g., "In talking with [this person] about your board over the past year, to what extent has your objective been to give [him/her] the impression that the board engages in independent control over management?"). Respondents answered these questions separately for each security analyst with whom they had communicated during the past 12 months. Factor analysis with promax rotation showed that the survey items loaded on one factor as expected: loadings were greater than .5 on the same factor and less than .2 on other factors. 3 Cronbach's coefficient alpha (␣) was .87, indicating an acceptably high level of interitem reliability. To assess interrater reliability, we compared CEO and analyst responses using the weighted kappa coefficient, which corrects for the degree of convergence between raters that would be expected by chance. According to Fleiss (1981) , values above .75 indicate excellent agreement between raters, and values between .4 and .75 suggest fair to good agreement. As shown in Appendix A, kappas exceeded .75 for items in both the CEO and analyst surveys (questions about the CEO's objective in communicating with analysts were not included in the analyst survey). In the primary analyses, we used CEO responses to measure this construct, but in separate analyses we used analyst responses (i.e., for the subsample of dyads with a responding CEO and analysts). The results for hypothesized associations were unchanged.
A larger set of questions asked managers to report their involvement in various forms of communication with security analysts during the prior 12 months. Responses indicated that it is extremely rare for managers other than CEOs to communicate with analysts about corporate governance, thus justifying our focus on CEO communications. Bednar and Westphal (2006) also found independent evidence that other executives rarely communicate with financial stakeholders about boards. Nevertheless, as discussed below, we developed separate measures to control for communication between other executives and analysts on topics other than corporate governance.
Actual board control. Our measure of actual board control is based on a survey scale developed by Westphal (1999) (also see Bednar and Westphal [2006] ). Appendix A presents the scale items. Bednar and Westphal (2006) reported high levels of interitem and interrater reliability for the scale; the alpha coefficient was .91, and kappa coefficients exceeded .75 for all items. Interitem reliability was high for our sample as well (␣ ϭ .88) and, as shown in Appendix A, kappas were greater than .75 for all items, suggesting a high level of agreement between CEOs and outside directors about level of board control. In the primary analyses, we used CEO responses to measure this construct, but in separate analyses we used outside director responses (where more than one outside director responded for the same company, one set of responses was randomly selected), and found that the hypothesized results were unchanged. Moreover, in the primary analyses board control was measured at time t ϩ 1 (i.e., the year after the year in which analyst appraisals were measured). In separate analyses, we measured board control at time t ϩ 2 using outside director responses, and again the hypothesized results were unchanged.
Analyst appraisals. As discussed above, we examined two types of analyst appraisals: earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. To test the effects of analysts' past earnings forecasts on formal board independence (Hypothesis 1), we took the median value of the most recent quarterly earnings forecasts for a company. To test the effects of analysts' past earnings forecasts on CEOs' verbal impression management directed toward individual analysts (Hypothesis 2), we used the most recent quarterly forecast issued by an analyst for a company. Finally, to test the effects of board composition and verbal impression management on subsequent earnings forecasts (Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5), we took the first forecast after the survey date of each analyst who covered a firm.
Stock recommendations are typically divided into five categories: 1, "strong sell," 2, "sell," 3, "hold," 4, "buy," 5, "strong buy." Some researchers have argued that the distinctions among "buy," "hold," and "sell" is more meaningful to investors than the distinction between "buy" and "strong buy" (or that between "sell" and "strong sell") (Fleischer, 2008) . We addressed this issue in part by controlling for an analyst's most recent recommendation in estimating the likelihood of upgrades and downgrades. In addition, we ran separate analyses using a trichotomous measure of stock recommendations (1 ϭ "sell," 2 ϭ "hold," 3 ϭ "buy"); the results of tests of hypothesized associations were unchanged from those presented below. To test the effects of analysts' stock recommendations on formal board independence (Hypothesis 1), we took the average value of analysts' most recent recommendations for a firm. To test the effects of analysts' stock recommendations on verbal impression management directed toward individual analysts (Hypothesis 2), we used the most recent recommendation issued by a focal analyst for a focal company. To test the effects of increased board independence and verbal impression management on subsequent stock recommendations (Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5), we created dichotomous variables to indicate whether or not a particular analyst had issued an upgrade or a downgrade of a focal firm's stock during the 12 months after the survey date. In other analyses, we measured these variables over alternative time periods (18 months or two years), and the results for hypothesized associations were very similar to those reported below.
CEO social influence over nominating committee. Our primary indicator of a CEO's social influence over the nominating committee of his or her firm's board was the proportion of committee members with friendship ties to the CEO. As discussed above, organization theorists have long argued that CEOs exert more influence over board decision making when they have friendship ties to a large portion of outside directors, and several empirical studies have found support for this proposition (for a review, see Finkelstein et al. [2008] ; also see Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin [1988] and Westphal [1999] ). In the context of director selection, a CEO's friends should be especially inclined to support his/her preferences for new board members. To measure friendship ties between a firm's CEO and members of its nominating committee, we used a standard survey scale prompting CEOs to indicate whether each board member was (1) "among your closest friends," (2) "a friend, but not among your closest friends," (3) "less than a friend but more than an acquaintance," or (4) "an acquaintance." This measure has been validated in several recent studies (e.g., Bednar & Westphal, 2006; Westphal, 1999) , and a similar measure of friendship is commonly used in social network research (Brass, 1984; Lin & Dumin, 1986 ). We found a high level of interrater agreement for the scale (weighted ϭ .88), in keeping with prior research. In the primary analyses, we used CEO responses to measure friendship ties, but in separate analyses we used outside director responses. The results of tests of hypothesized associations were unchanged.
Moreover, in separate analyses we used several other indicators of CEO social influence over a nominating committee. Theory and evidence suggest that shared committee memberships on other boards and certain demographic similarities indicate social ties between top managers and outside directors . Thus, shared memberships and demographic similarity have been associated with CEO influence over boards (Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Carpenter & Wade, 2002; . We operationalized shared committee memberships as the portion of a firm's nominating committee members who served with the firm's CEO on a committee of another board, and we measured demographic similarity between the CEO and members of the nominating committee with respect to functional background, industry background, and educational affiliation. Separate analyses showed that shared memberships and demographic similarity were significantly and positively correlated with our survey measure of friendship ties (r's ϭ .48 and .53, respectively), providing further evidence of the validity of our survey measure. We also conducted separate tests of Hypothesis 1 using shared committee memberships and demographic similarity as measures of CEO social influence, and the results for hypothesized associations were very similar to those reported below.
Other independent variables. We measured formal board independence as the number of outside directors without known employment or business ties to the firm for which they were directors (i.e., other than their directorship) divided by the total number of board members (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004; Brickley et al., 1994) . In the tables, we refer to such directors as formally independent directors. We used the product-term method to test interaction effects, with variables centered to reduce the likelihood of multicollinearity.
Control variables. We controlled for characteristics of analysts, firms, and executive-analyst relations that could influence changes in board composition, CEO verbal impression management, or analyst decision making. First, CEOs may concentrate impression management on analysts who are held in relatively high esteem in the financial community, or who otherwise exert disproportionate influence over investor behavior. Thus, we included two controls that are thought to reflect an analyst's status or influence in the financial community: selection as an "All-America" analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor ("All-America status") and the size of the analyst's employer, measured as the total number of analysts employed at the focal person's firm (cf. Clement & Tse, 2003; Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000; Stickel, 1995) . The level of CEO impression management directed toward analysts could also depend on the overall level of social interaction between them. Frequent social interaction could also influence analysts' appraisals of a firm independently of the CEO's impression management activity. Thus, we developed a survey measure of the social interaction between a CEO and a focal analyst during the prior year. This scale had acceptably high interitem and interrater reliability (␣ ϭ .85, ϭ .77-.83). We also controlled for a survey measure of friendship ties between CEOs and analysts (cf. Burt, 1992) . Although prior evidence suggests that such ties are fairly rare (Bednar & Westphal, 2006) , they could nevertheless affect analyst decision making, as well as the perceived need for CEOs to engage in impression management. We found a high level of agreement (91 percent) between CEOs and analysts about their relationship as friends, acquaintances, or strangers, providing evidence for interrater reliability of our measure. We also controlled for verbal impression management by CEOs directed toward analysts on subjects other than their firms' boards (CEO verbal impression management about other firm attributes). The survey included questions that parallel the items on board control and addressed impression management about strategy and firm outcomes (e.g., "How many times during the past year have you sought to convince [this person] that your corporate strategy is sound?"). Responses to the scale items loaded on a single factor, and there was evidence for interitem and interrater reliability of the scale (␣ ϭ .86, ϭ .75-.85).
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In separate analyses of analyst appraisals, we controlled for Westphal and Clement's (2008) survey measure of favor rendering by CEOs directed toward security analysts. Although this measure was positively and significantly related to subsequent earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, it was not positively correlated with CEO verbal impression management about board control or formal board independence, and its inclusion in the models did not affect the significance of the hypothesized relationships.
As discussed above, our survey data suggest that it is very rare for executives other than CEOs to direct verbal impression management toward security analysts. Nevertheless, other top managers may seek to manage analyst impressions regarding corporate strategy or matters other than governance. Our pretest interviews suggested that CFOs and IROs sometimes engaged in such behavior. Thus, we developed two survey measures that gauge the level of verbal impression management behavior directed at individual analysts by CFOs and IROs (CFO/IRO verbal impression management). The scale items were similar to those in the verbal impression management scale displayed in Appendix A but refer to impression management regarding any firm-related subject. These scales had acceptable interitem reliability (␣'s ϭ .84 and .88, respectively).
Prior research has provided evidence for a substitute relationship between board independence and indicators of CEO incentive alignment (Beatty & Zajac, 1994) . Thus, we controlled for two sources of incentive alignment in models of board independence and control: CEO stock ownership, measured as a percentage of total common stock, and the performance contingency of CEO compensation, measured as the total value of long-term incentives granted to a firm's CEO divided by total direct compensation (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) . Moreover, although prior evidence is mixed, several studies have hypothesized that institutional investors with relatively large ownership stakes in a firm tend to pressure the firm's directors to increase their independence and to exert greater control over management (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Kochhar & David, 1996) . Thus, we controlled for ownership by so-called pressure-resistant institutional investors, which include public pension funds, mutual funds, endowments and foundations, in models of formal board independence and actual board control (Brickley et al., 1988; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003: 5; Ryan & Schneider, 2002) . We measured institutional ownership as a percentage of total common stock outstanding. A number of studies have proposed that separation of CEO and board chair positions (i.e., allocating the board chair to an outside director) is associated with policy outcomes that reflect board control, such as lower CEO compensation (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002; Finkelstein et al., 2008) . Thus, we also controlled for separation of these positions in models of board independence and control.
To the extent that large firms are especially visible to external stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) , they may experience greater pressure to demonstrate board control (Finkelstein et al., 2008) . Thus, we controlled for firm size, measured as total sales. Corporate diversification could also be related to the level of board control. On the one hand, increased diversification might prompt greater board control, as it can be viewed as an indication of agency costs (that is, managerial pursuit of diversification beyond the level at which shareholder wealth is maximized [Amihud & Lev, 1999; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999; Hill & Snell, 1989] ). On the other hand, the heightened complexity of diversified firms may reduce the ability of directors to effectively control management decision making (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996) . Although the direction of this relationship is not clear a priori, as a precaution we also controlled for the entropy measure of corporate diversification. We also controlled for the announcement of a diversifying acquisition, coded 1 if a firm had announced such an acquisition in the prior year and 0 otherwise. Acquisitions were coded as diversifying when the primary two-digit SIC code of the acquiring firm did not match that of the acquired firm (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Krishnan & Miller, 1997; Kroll, Wright, Toombs, & Leavell, 1997) . Moreover, given some prior evidence that firms may adapt to poor performance by increasing board independence (Useem, 1996) , and abundant evidence linking reported earnings to subsequent analyst forecasts and stock recommendations, we controlled for corporate earnings in the prior year. In separate analyses, we used alternative measures of firm performance, including return on assets and stock market returns, and the results for hypothesized associations were unchanged.
We controlled for the prior value of the dependent variable in analyses of formal board independence (prior number of formally independent/dependent directors). In models of actual board control, moreover, we included a survey measure of actual control in the prior year (prior board control), and we controlled for an analyst's most recent recommendation for a focal firm in estimating upgrades and downgrades (prior recommendation). Finally, we included a dummy variable to control for the year in which the survey was distributed (0 ϭ 2001; 1 ϭ 2003; time period), and we included dummy variables for the n -1 two-digit SIC codes in the sample (coefficients are not reported).
Analysis
Given the well-known potential problems with estimating ratio variables (Firebaugh & Gibbs, 1985) , we tested the hypothesized effects of analysts' forecasts and recommendations on the portion of directors who are formally independent from management using simultaneous equations: one estimating the number of formally independent directors, one estimating the number of dependent directors, and one estimating actual board control. Our hypotheses would be confirmed if, for example, analysts' negative earnings forecasts and stock recommendations had positive effects on the number of formally independent directors and negative effects on the number of dependent directors, but without increasing the level of actual board control. Since the numbers of independent/dependent directors were count variables with extra-Poisson variation, we used negative binomial regression analysis for these equations. To correct for possible endogeneity between the number of independent directors, the number of dependent directors, and board control, we estimated all three equations simultaneously using three-stage regression (Greene, 2003) . This procedure, essentially a combination of two-stage regression and seemingly unrelated regression, includes three steps: (1) developing instrumented values for all endogenous variables (i.e., the number of formally independent directors, the number of dependent directors, and actual board control), (2) obtaining a consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances, where the estimates are based on residuals from a two-stage estimation of each structural equation, and (3) estimating the model using the covariance matrix estimated in the second stage with the instrumented values in place of the right-hand endogenous variables (Greene, 2003) . Separate analyses indicated that results were not dependent on the use of three-stage regression. For example, the results for hypothesized associations were unchanged when we (1) estimated the ratio of independent to nonindependent directors using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression or (2) estimated the number of independent directors while controlling for board size, again using OLS. The results of the three-stage analysis are provided below, and the other results are available from the authors. In the primary analyses, we estimated the number of independent/dependent directors in the subsequent year, but in separate analyses we used alternative time lags (two years or three years), and found the results were substantively unchanged.
We estimated models of verbal impression management directed toward analysts for the full sample of CEO-analyst dyads (n ϭ 8,357). This sample includes 1,311 different CEOs and 2,308 different analysts. Since each CEO could interact with multiple analysts, and most analysts are paired with multiple CEOs, the residuals for dyads that included the same CEO or the same analyst could be correlated. Thus, to correct for nonindependence of observations resulting from observation clustering, we estimated robust standard errors using the "robust cluster" subcommand in STATA (Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001; StataCorp, 2005) . We also tested the effects of board composition and CEO verbal impression management on analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for the full sample of CEO-analyst dyads. To address possible concerns about endogeneity, we used two-stage least squares regression analysis in STATA (Greene, 2003) . This procedure generated instru- mented values of board independence and verbal impression management and included them with the other exogenous variables in estimating subsequent earnings estimates. The equations estimating board independence, verbal impression management, and earnings forecasts were estimated simultaneously. Moreover, we used two-stage logistic regression analysis to estimate the likelihood of analyst downgrades and upgrades. We calculated Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation, which confirmed that the two-stage regression procedure was successful in correcting for any autocorrelation in the error terms resulting from endogeneity (Godfrey, 1988) . We again corrected for observation clustering by estimating robust standard errors. As a further robustness check to ensure that endogeneity did not bias the effects of board independence and verbal impression management, we estimated a simultaneous equation model using LISREL. In separate analyses of verbal impression management, earnings forecasts, and stock recommendations, one analyst was randomly selected for each CEO (n ϭ 1,311). The results for hypothesized associations, which are presented below, were substantively unchanged in these analyses. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation coefficients. Table 2 presents the results of our three-stage regression models of formal board independence and board control. These models provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, as shown in the interaction model, relatively low earnings forecasts interact with CEOs' social influence over their board nominating committees to predict (1) subsequent increases in the number of formally independent directors and (2) subsequent decreases in the number of nonindependent directors (note that the variable for earnings forecasts is inverted so that higher values indicate less positive forecasts). Thus, to the extent that CEOs have social influence over nominating committees, relatively low earnings forecasts are associated with increases in the proportion of board members who are formally independent of management.
RESULTS
5 Yet, as shown in the last column of the table, the independent variables are unrelated to the actual level of board control. In further support of Hypothesis 1, the results also indicate that relatively negative stock recommendations interact with this form of social influence to predict increases in the number of formally independent directors and decreases in the number of nonindependent directors, while having no significant effect on the actual level of board control. The magnitude of the effects of negative analyst appraisals on increased board independence is considerable. For instance, when a CEO's social influence over a nominating committee is relatively high (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean), a decrease in analysts' stock recommendations from a hold to a sell is associated with an average subsequent increase of 2.1 independent directors to the board. Moreover, graphs of the interactions were consis-5 Given that we controlled for the prior level of the dependent variable in these models, our analysis effectively estimates change in board independence. Although the results could be interpreted as suggesting that low earnings forecasts are associated either with increases in board independence or with smaller reductions in independence, nearly all instances of change among firms in our sample involved an increase. tent with our interpretation of the regression results (available from the authors on request). The graphs show a positive association between lower analyst appraisals and subsequent increases in formally independent directors at high levels of CEO social influence (one standard deviation above the mean) over the full range of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Similarly, the graphs show the absence of an association between analyst appraisals and the number of independent directors at low levels of CEO social influence (one standard deviation below the mean) over the full range of both independent variables. Table 3 displays the results of robust regression analyses of CEO verbal impression management. In keeping with Hypothesis 2, lower earnings forecasts and more negative stock recommendations by an analyst are associated with significantly higher levels of CEO verbal impression management about board control directed toward the analyst. Table 4 provides the results of two-stage regression analyses of analysts' earnings forecasts. The results in model 1 support Hypothesis 3: the proportion of formally independent directors is positively associated with subsequent earnings forecasts. Yet the level of actual board control (as reported by CEOs and validated by directors) does not have a significant effect on subsequent forecasts. The results in model 1 also support Hypothesis 4: the analyses controlling for the actual level of board control indicate that CEO verbal impression management is associated with more positive subsequent earnings forecasts. Hypothesis 5 is supported in model 2. The proportion of a board composed of formally independent directors and CEO verbal impression management interact: formal board independence has a significantly more positive effect on subsequent earnings forecasts to the extent that CEOs engage in such behavior. Again, the actual level of board control does not predict analysts' forecasts in these models. Table 5 presents the results of two-stage logistic regression analyses of analyst downgrades and upgrades, and they provide a pattern of results similar to those of the models of analysts' earnings forecasts. The results in models 1 and 3 further support Hypothesis 3: the proportion of a board composed of formally independent directors is positively associated with the likelihood of an upgrade and negatively associated with the likelihood of a downgrade. Yet the actual level of board control does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of upgrades or downgrades. There is also further support for Hypothesis 4: after controlling for actual board control, we found that CEO verbal impression management is positively associated with the likelihood of an upgrade and negatively associated with the likelihood of a downgrade. Hypothe- sis 5 is also further supported: as shown in model 4, the interaction between board independence and verbal impression management is positive, in that the proportion of formally independent directors is more positively associated with the likelihood of an upgrade to the extent that CEOs engage in verbal impression management. As shown in model 2, this interaction is also significant in predicting the likelihood of a downgrade (in a one-tailed test). Moreover, graphical displays of the interactions were consistent with our interpretation of the regression results (available on request). Again, the magnitude of these effects is notable. If verbal impression management is relatively high (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean), adding two independent directors to a board of average size increases the likelihood of an upgrade by 36 percent on average and reduces the likelihood of a downgrade by 45 percent on average. As discussed above, the results were robust to different lag structures; we measured forecasts and recommendations over one to three years, and results were not substantively different. As noted above, as an alternative to our two-stage regression models estimated in STATA, we also estimated a simultaneous equation model using LISREL. As shown in Table 6 , the results of this analysis were consistent with the two-stage regression results discussed above. Moreover, as shown in the table, the values of three widely used fit indexes exceeded .90, providing evidence of good model fit (Bollen & Long, 1993) . The overall results support our theoretical premise that increases in formal board independence only result in significant increases in actual board control when accompanied by increases in social board independence. As a supplemental test of this assumption, in separate regression models we estimated the interactive effect of change in formal board independence and change in social board independence (that is, the portion of a board composed of a CEO's friends) on subsequent change in the level of actual board control. The interaction was significant and indicated that increases in formal independence only significantly increase board control when accompanied by increases in social independence.
To further test our interpretation of the results, we examined the criteria that directors use to select new board members. Our theoretical argument suggests that when a CEO exerts social influence over his/her nominating committee, negative analyst appraisals should prompt the committee to give greater weight to whether candidates appear to external constituents to be independent of management, while also giving greater weight to whether candidates have a social tie to the CEO and thus seem likely to support the CEO's leadership rather than actually controlling the CEO. To test this argument more directly, we included survey questions about the criteria used by a nominating committee to evaluate director candidates. A five-item scale measured the weight given to candidates' appearance of independence (for example, one item asked the extent to which the committee looked for a board candidate who will appear to external constituents to be independent of management). Two other multi-item scales measured the weight given to whether a director candidate (1) had a social tie to the CEO and (2) appeared likely to support the CEO's leadership rather than control management. Each of the three scales had acceptable interitem reliability (␣ ϭ .89 -.93). Interrater agreement was also acceptable for the subsample of firms with more than one responding director; kappas were greater than .75 for all the scale items but one, and that item's kappa of .72 was still in the range of good agreement (Fleiss, 1981) . We used these measures to examine whether director selection criteria mediated the hypothesized effects of negative analyst appraisals and CEO social influence on subsequent changes in board independence. We tested for mediation using the Sobel (1982) method for estimating standard errors, which has relatively low statistical power but also has low type I error rates. In separate analyses, we used the MacKinnon method for estimating standard errors, which has more accurate type I error rates under certain conditions, and the results were (NFI) .94 Comparative fit index (CFI) .95 a n ϭ 1,311; t-statistics are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. * p Յ .05 ** p Յ .01 *** p Յ .001
nearly identical (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) . As shown in Appendix B, evidence for mediation was strong: the weight given to director candidates' appearance of independence mediated the effect of CEO social influence and low earnings forecasts on increased formal board independence. That is, low earnings forecasts interacted with CEO social influence to increase formal board independence by prompting nominating committees to assign greater weight to whether candidates appeared independent of management (this result also held for the effect of negative stock recommendations). Further results showed that the weight given to whether director candidates had social ties to the CEO of a focal firm also mediated the effect of CEO social influence and negative analyst appraisals on increases in the proportion of directors who were friends of the CEOs. Low forecasts and negative stock recommendations interacted with CEO social influence to increase the proportion of directors who were CEO friends by prompting nominating committees to assign greater weight to whether director candidates (1) had social ties to the CEOs and (2) appeared likely to support rather than control management. These supplementary analyses support our theoretical perspective because they show that when CEOs have social influence over their firms' nominating committees, negative analyst appraisals prompt the committees to favor candidates who give the appearance of independence but who are unlikely to actually exercise control (given their social ties to the CEOs). These analyses provide relatively direct evidence that impression management concerns mediate the hypothesized effects of negative analyst appraisals and CEO social influence on subsequent changes in board independence. We considered several possible alternative explanations for the results we obtained for the effects of increased formal board independence and verbal impression management on analyst appraisals. It might be suggested that analysts react positively to increases in formal board independence because such changes signal other positive attributes of a firm or its leadership aside from increased board control. On one level, this interpretation does not explain why CEO verbal impression management regarding board control of management would amplify the effects of formal board independence on analyst appraisals. Moreover, according to the agency logic of governance that predominates in the financial community, board independence is important to corporate governance and performance because it indicates a board's control capacity. Nevertheless, as a further test of our interpretation, we examined whether analysts' perceptions of actual board control mediated the effects of formal board independence and verbal impression management on earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. The analyst survey included a fouritem scale that gauged respondents' perceptions of board control at the specific companies that they covered (e.g., "To what extent do you believe that the board of [company name] exercises independent control over management?"). Interitem reliability of this scale was acceptably high (␣ ϭ .89). There was strong evidence that this measure mediated the effects of formal independence and verbal impression management. The Sobel test confirmed that analysts' perception of board control significantly mediated the effects of formal board independence on subsequent earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. That is, greater formal board independence (in combination with CEO verbal impression management) increased the likelihood of upgrades and prompted more positive earnings forecasts by increasing analysts' perception that boards actively controlled management.
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DISCUSSION
Overall, the results strongly supported our theoretical perspective on impression management regarding board control over management. The first set of results suggested that relatively negative an-6 Our analyses controlled for impression management by CEOs directed toward analysts on subjects other than their boards, including impression management about strategy and firm outcomes such as earnings or growth. Moreover, the results were robust to alternative definitions of director independence. In separate analyses, we classified independent directors as (1) all outsiders, (2) outsiders who were not former employees of the firms, or (3) had not been employed at the firms within five years Frankel, McVay, & Solomon, 2006) and found that results on hypothesized associations were unchanged. The results were also robust to use of different time lags for the dependent measures, including the survey measure of actual board control and the archival measures of formal board independence, analyst recommendations, and earnings forecasts. In one of our supplementary analyses, we measured actual board control using outside director responses at time t ϩ 2 (i.e., two years after the time at which analyst appraisals were measured), and the results were unchanged. This analysis addressed the possibility that negative analyst assessments increase formal board independence but not actual board control because there is a lag between change in independence and change in board behavior (e.g., if newly appointed directors take time to learn about issues facing the company). alyst appraisals, in the form of less optimistic earnings forecasts and less positive stock recommendations, prompted influential corporate leaders to increase dimensions of board independence that were visible to external constituents without actually increasing their boards' tendency to control management. Further results indicated that relatively negative analyst appraisals also prompted higher levels of verbal impression management directed toward analysts. In particular, in response to negative analyst appraisals of their firms, CEOs sought to manage the impressions of security analysts about the quality of their firms' governance by attesting to their boards' propensity to monitor and control management decision making on behalf of shareholders. These findings are consistent with our expectation that corporate leaders will respond to relatively negative analyst appraisals of their firms by initiating changes in board composition and verbal communications that give the impression of conformity to prevailing normative prescriptions of corporate governance. The results also suggest how and when the appearance of greater board control is decoupled from actual board behavior. Specifically, when a CEO possesses a priori social influence over the nominating committee of his/her firm's board, the board responds to negative analyst appraisals by adding directors who lack visible contractual ties to the firm but with whom the CEO has existing social ties, thus increasing the board's formal independence from management (giving the appearance of greater board control) without increasing its social independence (thus avoiding actual increases in board control and preserving the CEO's discretion over corporate policy). 7 Additional results confirmed that the relationships between CEOs' social influence, negative analyst appraisals, and subsequent changes in board composition were significantly mediated by change in the criteria used to evaluate director candidates. When CEOs had social influence over nominating committees, negative analyst appraisals prompted committees to assign greater weight to whether candidates for board positions (1) gave the appearance of being independent of management, (2) had a CEO social tie, and (3) appeared likely to support CEO leadership rather than control management. These results appear to provide relatively strong evidence that the separation of formal board independence from social board independence and actual board behavior in response to negative analyst appraisals reflects impression management. In particular, it appears that when a CEO possesses social influence over a nominating committee, negative analyst appraisals prompt intentional efforts by the committee to appoint directors who appear likely to control management, but who are actually likely to support management.
The second set of findings addressed the consequences of impression management. Specific results indicated that formal board independence interacts with verbal impression management by a CEO to prompt more optimistic earnings forecasts and more positive stock recommendations by security analysts. The results also showed that the actual level of board control-as reported by CEOs and validated by directors-did not have a significant effect on analysts' appraisals. These results support our contention that corporate leaders can successfully manage the impressions of external constituents about the governance of their firms by engaging in communications that frame board behavior in terms of a central normative prescription of the agency logic of governance, while making visible changes in board composition that appear to lend credence to their claims, but that are decoupled from actual board behavior. Our theoreti-7 It should be acknowledged that our findings are predicated in part on a null result (i.e., the absence of a relationship between negative analyst appraisals and board control). However, it seems unlikely that measurement error or sampling error drove this result, for several reasons. First, as shown in Table 2 , the standard errors for the coefficients of the independent variables are quite small in the equations that estimate actual board control, and they are similar to the standard errors in the equations that estimate change in formal board independence. Yet the coefficients for the independent variables are consistently much smaller in the equations that estimate actual board control than in the equations that estimate formal board independence. Second, effects of the control variables on our measure of actual board control are very similar to results reported in prior research (cf. Westphal, 1999) . Third, our measure of actual board control has been validated in prior studies (e.g., Bednar & Westphal, 2006; Westphal, 1999) , and we also found strong evidence for the interitem and interrater reliability of this measure in the present study. Fourth, it seems unlikely that the null effect is due to measurement error in the independent variables, not only because the standard errors are small, but also because these variables do significantly predict change in formal board independence as expected. Fifth, our large sample size should have provided adequate power with which to find an effect of the independent variables on actual board control if such an effect existed. Finally, it seems unlikely that the null effect is due to sampling error as we had considerable evidence that our sample was representative of the larger population.
cal perspective suggested why firms may derive legitimacy benefits from increasing their boards' formal independence from management, even when such changes do not reflect the actual level of board control. Specifically, we argued that such legitimacy benefits are possible because the prevailing agency logic of governance effectively equates formal independence with a board's capacity to exercise control on behalf of shareholders. Moreover, the decoupling of formal board independence from actual board control is also likely to be facilitated by information asymmetry in relations between corporate leaders and external constituents, since the behavioral dynamics of CEO-board relationships are difficult for external actors to observe and monitor. 8 Taken together, our theory and supportive findings contribute to the corporate governance literature by showing the potential for impression management in the domain of corporate boards. Although recent research has provided evidence of impression management in regard to executive incentives (Westphal & Zajac, 1998) , prior research has not examined the potential for such social influence in regard to board control of management, which is perhaps the central normative prescription of the agency logic of governance.
By extension, our study provides a new perspective on board independence from management and its consequences for organizations. Researchers and corporate stakeholders alike typically view increased formal board independence as a reform intended to improve corporate governance by increasing board control over management. Our theory and findings suggest that, at least under certain circumstances (that is, when CEOs have social influence over nominating committees), increased formal board independence in response to negative analyst appraisals can instead be viewed as an act of impression management. Our study also offers a novel perspective on the consequences of increased board independence for firms. Organizational and behavioral strategy scholars have generally concluded that increases in formal board independence have little impact on organizations, given abundant evidence that such changes have weak or insignificant effects on executive compensation policy, corporate strategy, and firm profitability. Our theory and supportive findings suggest that increased formal board independence does in fact have important consequences for organizations. In particular, it has symbolic value by increasing the legitimacy of a firm's corporate governance with external constituents without causing substantive improvements in the actual governance of the firm. Given that analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecasts have a significant impact on trading behavior and stock market valuations (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001; Womack, 1996; Zuckerman, 2000) , our findings suggest how impression management about a firm's board can distort the market value of the firm, ultimately reducing the allocative efficiency of the capital market.
Our theory and results also suggest a reinterpretation of findings from studies in financial economics and the economics-based strategy literature on board independence from management. Several studies in these literatures appear to provide evidence for agency theory or related economic perspectives on corporate governance by showing positive stock market reactions to changes in board composition that increase a board's formal independence from its firm (e.g., Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990) . Such results are typically interpreted as evidence that increased board independence improves organizational performance, as agency theory suggests. Other studies have claimed support for agency theory or related financial economic perspectives by showing that (1) relatively poor firm performance prompts increases in board formal independence, which appears to suggest that firms increase board independence in order to improve organizational efficiency; (2) the level of institutional investor ownership is associated with higher levels of board independence, which appears to suggest that powerful owners force firms to improve their internal controls in order to improve organizational efficiency; (3) board independence is negatively associated with the use of executive incentives, which appears to suggest a substitute relationship between board control and managerial incentive 8 We examined whether analysts might become less susceptible to impression management through experience by interacting our independent variables with indicators of analyst experience in models of analyst appraisals. Experience was measured as the number of years that an individual had been employed as a security analyst. The interactions were consistently insignificant: increases in formal board independence and verbal impression management by CEOs were no less effective in influencing the forecasts and recommendations of relatively experienced analysts. The effects were also not contingent on two variables believed to indicate analysts' status and success in the financial community (Clement & Tse, 2003; Hong et al., 2000; Stickel, 1995) : (1) whether analysts had been selected for Institutional Investor's All-America list or (2) the size of analysts' employers. Thus, impression management is no less effective in influencing analysts who are respected by their peers and rewarded by their employers. alignment, as hypothesized by agency theorists; and (4) board independence is associated with higher bond ratings, which is again interpreted by financial economists and agency-based strategy researchers as evidence that formally independent directors improve organizational efficiency (for reviews, see Bhojraj and Sengupta [2003] and Hillman and Dalziel [2003] ). Our findings cast doubt on prevailing interpretations of such findings in the financial economics and agency-based strategy literatures. The separation of formal board independence and actual board control suggests that positive stock market reactions to increased formal board independence may reflect a prevailing impression among financial market actors that firms have acted to improve their corporate governance by conforming to agency prescriptions, rather than indicating actual organizational efficiency benefits derived from greater board control. This interpretation is especially plausible given that security analyst appraisals are known to have a significant impact on stock market reactions to policy adoptions, and our findings indicate that analyst appraisals are influenced more by the appearance of board control (i.e., increases in formal board independence) than by actual changes in board behavior.
Similarly, evidence that formal board independence is associated with higher bond ratings may indicate that investment banks, like security analysts, are influenced by impression management. Poor firm performance or increased institutional ownership may prompt such impression management. Moreover, evidence for a negative association between formal board independence and executive incentives does not necessarily indicate a substitute relationship between board control and incentive alignment, as financial economists and agency-based strategy researchers have claimed. As discussed previously, there is evidence that, within the financial community, the agency logic has become taken for granted. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that financial economists, as members of this community, assume that formal board independence indicates effective corporate control. In effect, agency theory may be more useful for explaining how certain corporate stakeholders and researchers perceive or assess boards of directors than for explaining how boards actually operate.
Although growing evidence suggests institutionalization of agency theory, this does not mean that every analyst personally believes in the theory without reservation. Some analysts may have personal reservations or uncertainties about whether increased formal independence necessarily indicates effective governance. However, our interviews and survey data suggested that analysts generally do believe that formal board independence is a widely accepted criterion by which to evaluate board effectiveness. Analysts are aware that increases in formal independence have been generally well received by members of the financial community in the past, and consequently perceive that it is safe to interpret such changes in board composition as an indication of improved corporate governance in the present. When we explicitly asked analysts in our interviews about the relevance of social ties between CEOs and directors, they routinely acknowledged that such ties could be important but that they do not focus on them. When asked why, they typically suggested that it would be too time consuming to gather information about social ties between CEOs and directors. For example, one analyst noted, "We simply don't have the time or resources to try to do a very in-depth analysis of corporate governance." When asked whether information from a CEO about board behavior could be misleading, one analyst said, "Could the CEO be exaggerating about [board control]? Maybe. But it's the best information I have, and he did give the right answer, not the wrong answer." In effect, increased formal board independence is viewed as a convenient rule-of-thumb in assessing board effectiveness, and verbal information from CEOs is viewed as a convenient supplement to information about board composition.
Our theory and findings answer Finkelstein et al.'s (2008: 57) call for research into the black box of board behavior. They suggest that corporate leaders respond to negative analyst appraisals of their firms not by instigating substantive board reforms that improve corporate governance, but by initiating changes in board composition and engaging in verbal communications with analysts that give the impression of board reform without actually changing board behavior. Moreover, such impression management had strong, positive effects on subsequent analyst appraisals of firms. Given that analyst appraisals are known to influence the perceptions and behavior of investors, journalists, and other corporate stakeholders (Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008) , our study suggests that impression management in the domain of corporate boards has important consequences for firm-constituent relations. We hope that by recognizing the potential for such impression management, corporate stakeholders can render more accurate assessments of corporate governance in the future. 
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